Wednesday, December 10, 2014

Questioning the Gutmann Article Questioning the Wainstein Report

InsideCarolina.com (IC) has published an article by Harold Gutmann that purportedly scratches the surface on the failures of the Wainstein investigation of UNC. After reading Gutmann's article and doing a little fact-checking of my own, I felt the need to question the questioner:



Prior to the Report's release, most cynics of the pending Wainstein investigation would probably have been colored Wolfpack Red or Duke Blue, many of whom were prepared for a "whitewash" by a faux-independent investigator.

So it's a bit of a switch that after 5-6 weeks of digesting the report (and it's associated exhibits and supplemental documentation - link), that the most vocal criticism of the report comes from the quarter that had been anticipating Wainstein would finally settle the truth of the matter and put an end to what they felt was a witch hunt.

Despite UNC-Chapel Hill Chancellor Carol Folt's acceptance of the Report and call to move forward without excuses...



...there is a growing movement from within the ranks of university advocates calling the Wainstein Report into question. Mr. Gutmann's won't be the last, nor the most pointed. I fully expect -- and sincerely look forward to -- a lengthy and detailed review of the flaws in the Wainstein investigation by Bradley Bethel at Coaching the Mind at some point. Bethel has drawn parallels between the Freeh Report in the case of the Penn St. Sandusky scandal and Wainstein's review of UNC's academic scandal involving student-athletes (here and here). According to him, Gutmann's article is just the tip of the iceberg in terms of how it misrepresented some subjects of the investigation, mainly those upon whose doorstep blame for the scandal was laid by Wainstein.

I'd like to examine Gutmann's "tip of the iceberg," which boils down to four errors or discrepancies that he suggests should lead a  critical reader to doubt the veracity of the Report on the whole. These are:
  1. The Morehead-Cain Scholar Discrepancy
    • The report relates an unverified story of a Morehead-Cain scholar having been referred to one of Crowder's paper classes to order to salvage a dipping GPA that was in danger of threatening his scholarship. 
    • Gutmann calls this anecdote into question, citing a letter from the Morehead-Cain Foundation executive director charging that it is unverified and without merit.
      (Click for more)
  2. The Bridger-Lee Slide Presentation Discrepancy:
    • The report provides an account of a slide presentation given to members of the football program, warning of the impending retirement of Debby Crowder and the anticipated end to the paper classes she offered. 
    • Gutmann presents objections by former head coach Davis and assistant coach Shoop that, at least in their cases, the presence of coaching staff at the meeting as it is depicted by Wainstein was misrepresented.
      (Click for more)
  3. The Former Players Tally Discrepancy:
    • The report cites the number of former players appearing in support of Roy Williams at an ESPN interview and the number of former Williams players interviewed by the investigation team. 
    • Gutmann presents Roy Williams' disputing the accuracy of the numbers cited by the Wainstein Report.
      (Click for more)
  4. The Wayne Walden Finding Discrepancy:
    • The report reaches conclusions about former men's basketball program academic counselor Wayne Walden's knowledge of and complicity in the paper class scheme. 
    • Gutmann provides a rationale for why Wainstein's finding re. Walden should be discounted.
      (Click for more)
The stated objective of the Gutmann article is to encourage a critical examination of the Wainstein Report since it will likely be cited as definitive. That's wise advice for reading any report, including essays like Gutmann's at InsideCarolina and mine here. Let's critically examine each of these discrepancy claims.

1. The Morehead-Cain Scholar Discrepancy

The account of a Morehead-Cain Scholar being referred to Debby Crowder's paper classes in order to help with a sagging GPA is found on pg. 51 of the Report. The extent to which Morehead-Cain Scholars are mentioned by Wainstein are: (1) a 3-sentence paragraph in a section of the Report listing various alternative ways in which non-athletes may have wound up enrolled in the AFAM paper classes; plus, (2) a 2-sentence footnote on pg. 68 discussing advisers in general. Makes a total of five (5) statements the Report makes about the anecdotal example (bolded emphasis mine):
  1. "Another referral venue was through the advisors for scholarship programs, including Carolina Covenant and Morehead-Cain Scholars."  (pg 51)
  2. "For example, we heard of one Morehead-Cain Scholar who was referred to Crowder for placement in a paper class when his GPA started to slip and he was in danger of losing his scholarship." (pg 51)
  3. "Crowder placed him in a paper class, he got an A, and was able to keep his scholarship." (pg 51)
  4. "As explained above, referrals to the AFAM paper classes were also made by the Morehead-Cain and CarolinaCovenant advisors." (pg. 68, footnote #132)
  5. "We have seen nothing to suggest that those advisors knew any more about the workings of the AFAM paper classes than their colleagues at the Steele Building." (pg. 68, footnote #132)
3 of the 5 sentences mention advisers for the Morehead-Cain Foundation, 2 of which are attributed with making referrals to Crowder. The discrepancy is that the Morehead-Cain Foundation employs no advisers.

Morehead-Cain Foundation executive director Charles Lovelace wrote in an open letter (which Mr. Gutmann graciously shared with me) stating that the Foundation objected to the Wainstein Report claiming that advisers attached to the Foundation had referred a Scholar to AFAM paper classes, and that their investigation had found the claim to be without merit. In the letter, Mr. Lovelace wasn't disputing that a Morehead-Cain Scholar had taken a paper class, nor that, had he, the goal could have been to bolster a sagging GPA. (Statements #2 and 3, above.) The objection was over the Report' suggesting that the Foundation, itself, had ever been complicit in referring any Scholar to such a class. (Statements #1, 4 and 5, at least as pertaining to Morehead-Cain Scholars.) 

Lovelace's letter relates that when the Foundation contacted the Wainstein team, the Wainstein response was to emphasize that an allegation of Foundation advisers making a referral wasn't a finding of fact, but rather a conveyance of what the investigators had heard. In other words, Wainstein's team wasn't reporting the referral as true, but rather retelling what an unnamed source had alleged. I'm not going to try to pester Kenneth Wainstein for his side of the story since I have no reason to be cautious of Lovelace's representation.

Given the implications of the Foundation being at all associated with any implied endorsement of the "paper class" scheme, I get why Mr. Lovelace would be keen on resolving the question and getting a correction on the record.

So why did Wainstein report it at all without seeking to verify the claim from anyone at the Foundation? That's a fair question.

Here's another one: why would the general public (outside of the Morehead-Can Foundation) even care? Personally, I didn't read the anecdote about the Morehead-Cain paper class referral and wonder how the Foundation could have gotten itself involved in this mess. It wasn't until after hearing that the executive director's letter even existed that I became aware that a parochial objection had been raised on that particular point. Given that Gutmann later insinuates Wainstein may have been guided by a preconceived "narrative," what narrative is suggested by the inclusion of the anecdote and the revelation that it went unverified by Wainstein? If the claim is assumed to be true, what "narrative" does it support?

Gutman opines the discrepancy is a possible "example that not everything in the $3 million report stands up to close scrutiny, a consideration that takes on bigger resonance if the NCAA is indeed using the report as a launching point for its own investigation." But how would adding an uncorroborated claim of how non-athletes might find their way into the paper classes enhance that NCAA resonance? If anything, wouldn't its inclusion mute such resonance as far as the NCAA is concerned? Hasn't the inclusion of non-athletes in the paper classes been a standard rationale for why this was an academic, not an athletic, issue?

I agree that if it impugns Morehead-Cain integrity, without any foundation other than hearsay, it ought not to be in there, and I can see why it would be important to the Morehead-Cain Foundation to set the record straight. But as for any "narrative" or discrediting of the Wainstein Report, isn't it rather picayune? If you don't agree with that, can you at least agree that its careless inclusion actually supports a "not an athletic, but academic scandal" narrative? If Wainstein's agenda was to seek resonance with the NCAA, including that anecdote doesn't help. 



2. The Bridger-Lee Slide Presentation Discrepancy

The alleged presentation by counselors from the Academic Support Program for Student-Athletes (ASPSA) to some members of the football team and coaching staff that included a slide about the impending retirement of Debby Crowder and the likely impact on the availability of classes she had arranged, has been a hot topic in the post-Wainstein Report discussions. A source of contention has been who, exactly, was present at that team meeting.

Unlike the Morehead-Cain anecdote, this one isn't minor and incidental; but rather goes directly to the core of the matter. Its veracity or dubiousness would factor significantly in terms of NCAA 'resonance.' What I understand Gutmann's criticism of the Wainstein Report to be in this instance isn't the truth of the claim that the ASPSA counselors presented the slide. The slide obviously existed and is on the record. The question is whether any of the coaching staff were audience to ASPSA reps Beth Bridger and Jaimie Lee's presentation, and were thus informed of the "true nature" of the paper classes. Wainstein, so the criticism goes, tries to pin that "true nature" knowledge on the coaching staff without performing its investigation with due diligence.

The Report cites that former football head coach Butch Davis, former director of football student-athlete development Andre Williams, associate athletic director for Football Administration Corey Holliday and some (most? all?) of the 2009 staff position coaches were present. Butch Davis and John Shoop (quarterback position coach at the time) were the only two from the coaching staff who were interviewed by Wainstein, and both claim to not remember the briefing. Shoop, emphatically denies having been present at any such briefing and has, since, expressed dismay at the exclusion from the Report of his denial. The Report did include Davis's claim of not remembering such a briefing.

The other assistant coaches (John Blake, Sam Pittman, Ken Browning, Steve Hagen, Tommy Thigpen, Charlie Williams, Everett Withers and John Lovett) either weren't contacted or wouldn't agree to be interviewed.

So, what is the complaint again? Gutmann is suggesting -- particularly by emphasizing John Shoop's criticisms about how his interview with Wainstein was handled and reported (or not reported, as the case may be) -- that Wainstein had an agenda and only sought information that fit that agenda. By citing the Bridger/Lee presentation and placing coaching staff there without verification of the coaches themselves, Wainstein (according to Gutmann) skews the picture to fit a narrative of coaching staff complicity in, or at least knowledge of, the nature of these "paper classes."

But was that really Wainstein's narrative? Does the suspicion stand up to scrutiny?

What Gutmann doesn't relate is that Shoop's vehement objections about the Wainstein investigation don't lead to the same conclusion as Gutmann's regarding Wainstein's agenda or "narrative." The frustration and resentment Shoop has expressed is over what he feels has been the scapegoating of certain individuals, pinning blame on some while insulating others, in order to present a narrative sought by his customer: Chancellor Folt and/or President Ross (and whoever the powers are pulling their strings.) Would Gutmann agree that Shoop and Davis were innocents, but the real engineers of fraud were, say, ASPSA directors like Cynthia Reynolds or Robert Mercer? How about the narrative that Wainstein's prescribed agenda was to leave the egg on football's face in order to insulate the basketball program?  Because that is what Shoop and Davis (updated: link to OTL program added 12/14/2014) are getting at with their objections to Wainstein cited by Mr. Gutmann.

Just whose narrative was Wainstein supposed to have been pursuing? Would Gutmann agree with Shoop that Wainstein's narrative is aligned with those who contracted to have him investigate the fraud? If not, then just who's narrative WAS Wainstein seeking to promote? Dan Kane's? Jay Smiths? What could possibly motivate Wainstein to push THAT narrative? (There actually may be an answer to that rhetorical question, but I'll let Gutmann or Bethel bring that to the table, if either wishes.)

But here's the thing: even if Wainstein was careless, or manipulating, or just plain wrong, and no coaches were present, is there doubt in Gutmann's mind that Bridger/Lee didn't really present that information to some people in the football organization? Even if no one on the football staff ever admits to seeing that slide, isn't its existence enough to illustrate that at least the counseling staff understood the purpose and necessity of the "paper class?" Surely Gutmann's not saying that because Davis and Shoop deny any knowledge or memory of that presentation, that the presentation never happened or that Wainstein fabricated the slide.



3. The Former-Players Tally Discrepancy

Gutmann third point that seeks to cast doubt on the report's integrity presents Roy Williams' noting of alleged discrepancies in the Wainstein Report.

Gutmann correctly quotes the report: "11 of Rashad McCants' teammates appeared together on ESPN when Williams refuted allegations made by made by McCants." Just after getting the Reports' language right, he then shares Williams' rendition: "it [Wainstein Report] said that we had 11 players from the ’05 team. It was not, there were seven." But this is different. Roy believes the 11 of the report are all from the '05 team; but the 11 student-athletes cited by the report came from all of the years McCants played at UNC.  Roy is right about 7 being from the 2005 roster, but that doesn't contradict the Report. There's no discrepancy there as Williams believes, and as Gutmann conveys.

Gutmann also relates Williams' saying "[Wainstein Report] said they talked to seven, they spoke to 10." It is true about what the Wainstein Report says:  the investigators did speak with 7 of the 11 from the group above. Is the an error? Did Wainstein really speak with 10 and misreported the number?

I don't know. But if Roy IS right about that one...so what? I fail to see how such an error -- if it is, in fact, in error - skews anything. Did Wainstein render 3 interviews null in order to sustain an anti-UNC narrative? What's the implication of such an error?

Is this a serious critique of the Wainstein Report? I almost feel embarrassed having even addressed it. Gutmann says himself that the numbers are immaterial to the issue of fraud, but what then IS material about this? Gutmann believing that Williams accurately identified counting mistakes in the Wainstein report because a confused Roy Williams says so betrays a lack of critical analysis of Williams of the sort he asks of those those reading the Wainstein report.


4. The Wayne Walden Finding Discrepancy

Lastly, Gutmann presents Roy Williams' most pointed objection to Wainstein's report, that being the besmirching of Wayne Walden. If the numbers "errors" above are immaterial, surely the issue of Walden - academic counselor that took over from Burgess McSwain during the 03/04 academic year -- is quite pertinent.

The Wainstein Report does indict Walden with having knowledge of, and even participation in, the scheme. Given Williams' high regard for Walden, it's completely understandable that he'd be resistant to believing what the Report alleges regarding Walden. It's only natural for Williams to want to discredit the discrediting of his long-time associate; but does his discomfort or disbelief present a sound, persuasive argument? Are we supposed to give Roy Williams' opinion weight over that of Wainstein for some reason?

The only objective basis given in defense of Walden is Gutmann stating "Men’s basketball players had mostly stopped taking the AFAM paper classes by 2008, and Walden left the school in 2009."

This is a graphic representation of the data found in the Exhibits addendum of the report.


The point when men's basketball enrollment in AFAM paper classes actually ended was after Walden left UNC. UNC advocates could really credit Jenn Townsend, Walden's replacement, for that. Did the Wainstein report fabricate this data to malign Walden? Or is the data trustworthy and it's Gutmann's claim that doesn't stand up to scrutiny?

No other examples are offered by Gutmann suggesting a Wainstein "narrative" with respect to Walden. Since Gutmann's claimed drop-off in AFAM paper classes isn't validated by the data, all that's left is Roy Williams' conviction that Wainstein is wrong about Walden.



In summary, I disagree with Bradley Bethel's assessment. I don't feel Harold Gutmann's article contributes to a dismantling of Wainstein Report. It's a good editorial piece in terms of appealing to an audience that is eager to make the pain of the scandal go away; but I hope that whatever Bethel has in store for us in revealing the rest of the iceberg will be more substantive.

I've invited Mr. Gutmann to provide feedback, which I would append to this article. I'm not immune from mistakes and maybe my counter-analysis is in error. I welcome correction and I'm not vested in any side being right or vindicated. I can be persuaded to change my mind.

Note: This article was originally posted in first draft form on the morning of December 9th, 2014, inviting Harold Gutmann an opportunity to offer any corrections or comment. That invitation is still open, but I've since revised some of the wording and deleted some statements I've since felt were incorrect.